The diplomatic game is particularly complex even by Middle Eastern standards. It is played at the intersection of three different sets of negotiations: the Syrian-Israeli peace talks, the Arab reconciliation Initiative and the American opening towards Damascus. The stakes are equally high since a shift in the Syrian position would have important repercussions in Lebanon, Palestine, Iraq and Iran.

The peace process between Syria and Israel is temporarily suspended due to the confused political situation in Israel a mere month after the general elections. However the election of a right-wing government in Jerusalem may paradoxically enhance the possibilities of a peace agreement with Damascus. Under considerable pressure from the Obama Administration, Netanyahu may find easier to return the Golan Height to Syria than to make any substantial concession on Jerusalem or the settlements in the West Bank.

The Arab reconciliation Initiative seems instead to be gaining momentum. The heads of States of Egypt, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Syria met in Riyadh last week and the atmosphere was allegedly friendlier than it has ever been in the last few years. It is worth recalling that Syrian President Bashir al Assad called the Egyptian and Saudi leaders “half men” for failing to intervene on the side of Lebanon during the Israeli military offensive in 2006 and accused them of complicity with the Zionist enemy during the operation in Gaza few months ago.

The effect of the Arab reconciliation are particularly evident in Cairo, where the negotiations between Hamas and Fatah are scheduled to restart this week, and in Lebanon, where parliamentary elections are scheduled for June 7th. In both cases Syria, who supports Hamas in Palestine and Hezbollah in Lebanon, has a crucial influence on the negotiations. A possible reconciliation between Damascus and the moderate Arab front would therefore make things easier also in Cairo and in Beirut. Last week’s opening of a Lebanese embassy in Damascus -for the first time in history- is indubitably an important signal in this direction.

The third element of this complex diplomatic game is, as anticipated, the American opening to Syria. The visit of Shapiro and Feltman to Damascus on March 7 represents a clear break from the failed policy of the Bush Administration directed at isolating the Syrian regime. However, according to Bilal Y Saab of the Brookings Institute, “It is too early to tell whether Washington’s opening to Damascus is purely tactical or of a strategic nature.” It is also important to point out that the problems between Syria and the US did not start with the Bush Administration and they have deep and real roots that require a more sustained and robust engagement strategy than a generic opening or a couple of trips to Damascus.

The negotiations between Syria and the US are clearly affected by those going on between Washington and Tehran. However, whether Obama’s opening towards Iran will be successful or not, the negotiations with Syria may very well keep going. In the first case they would probably be easier, in the second more useful. Kissinger’s success in convincing Egypt to switch sides during the Cold War is often cited as an example of what American diplomacy should do to convince Syria to break ties with Iran. Notwithstanding the fact that most of the economic and military help to Hamas and particularly to Hezbollah comes form Iran, without the logistical support of Syria (who shares borders with both Lebanon and Iran), Iran would find great difficulties in sustaining its proxies. Also, the alliance with an Arab and Sunni country such as Syria gives Iran a legitimacy that it would not have otherwise.

In conclusion a change in Syrian politics would be a pivotal moment in the international relations of the Middle East with broad effects in nearly all the countries of the Near East. However, Syrians are known to be skillful and patient negotiators. Miracles on the way to Damascus are not as common as we may hope.